BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//hacksw/handcal//NONSGML v1.0//EN CALSCALE:GREGORIAN BEGIN:VEVENT DTEND:20160225T210000Z UID:5df5689e81145 DTSTAMP:20191214T145630Z LOCATION:VPD 302 DESCRIPTION:

Firms face an optimization problem that requires a maximal quantity output given a quality constraint. How firms should incentivize quantity and quality to meet these dual goals remains an open question\, potentially due to limitations of field data. We provide a theoretical model and conduct an experiment in which participants are paid for both quantity and quality of a real effort task. Consistent with the theoretical predictions\, higher quality incentives encourage participants to shift their attention from quantity to quality\, and higher quality incentives reduce inefficient decision-making. We also observe behavioral components in responsiveness to the quality incentive.

URL;VALUE=URI:https://cesr.usc.edu/events/incentivizing_quantity_and_quality_outputan_experimental_investigation_quantity-quality_trade SUMMARY:Incentivizing Quantity and Quality of Output:An Experimental Investigation of the Quantity-Quality Trade-off DTSTART:20160225T200000Z END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR